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Abstract
We study the relationship between problems solvable by quantum algorithms in polynomial time and
those for which zero-knowledge proofs exist. In prior work, Aaronson [1] showed an oracle separation
between BQP and SZK, i.e. an oracle A such that SZKA 6⊆ BQPA. In this paper we give a simple
extension of Aaronson’s result to non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs with perfect security. This class,
NIPZK, is the most restrictive zero-knowledge class. We show that even for this class we can construct
an A with NIPZKA 6⊆ BQPA.
1 Introduction
We investigate the relationship between quantum-computable problems and those with zero-knowledge
proofs. We are motivated by the general desire of complexity theory to understand all relationships between
complexity classes, as well as implications this particular relationship has for quantum-resilient cryptography.
Specifically we consider the class BQP, those languages decidable by a quantum computer in polynomial
time with bounded error. (See [8] for a more thorough discussion.)
Zero-knowledge is really a family of complexity classes. In a zero-knowledge proof for language L, the
prover P must convince a verifier V that x ∈ L. The zero-knowledge property requires that the verifier
cannot learn anything other than the statement being proved. (For example, P cannot send a witness for x.)
This is formalized by requiring that a simulator without access to P can produce a transcript T ′ that is
indistinguishable from a transcript T of a real interaction. If T ′ is required to be distributed identically to T ,
then the resulting complexity class is perfect zero-knowledge (PZK). If it is required only to be statistically
close, we get statistical zero-knowledge (SZK). If it is only required to be computationally indistinguishable,
we get computational zero-knowedge (CZK). (See [3] for a more thorough discussion.)
We can further restrict the three classes above by requiring that the protocols be non-interactive. That
is, we require that the whole interaction between P and V consist of a single message sent from P to V . To
make this possible, we must give the parties access to a common random string. We therefore have three
non-interactive classes, analogous to those above (NICZK, NISZK, and NIPZK).
There are no unconditional results proving anything about the relationship between BQP and any of the
six zero-knowledge classes discussed above. However, Aaronson [1] gave an oracle separation, an oracle A
under which SZKA 6⊆ BQPA. This is evidence that there are problems with zero-knowledge proofs but no
quantum algorithms, and it rules out many proof techniques for proving otherwise. In this paper we give a
simple extension of this result, showing an oracle separation between BQP and NIPZK. NIPZK is the most
restrictive of the zero-knowledge classes, so when we show an A such that NIPZKA 6⊆ BQPA we implicitly
show the same for PZK, NICZK, and NISZK.
Implications for cryptography In recent years a variety of cryptographic protocols have been built using
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. For example, Miller et al. use them to create a cryptocurrency that
can be generated and spent anonymously [9]. Haralambiev uses them to create leakage-resilient signatures,
signatures that remain secure even when some of the secret key is disclosed [4]. Juels et al. show they can
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be used in a less desirable way, allowing crowdfunding to be used to reward hackers for disclosing the secret
information of their victims [5].
The cryptographic community has also recently spent considerable effort finding protocols that will remain
secure in the face of adversaries with quantum computers. If the non-interactive zero-knowledge classes were
contained in BQP, it would imply that cryptographic protocols using such proofs could not be made resilient
to such quantum adversaries.
2 Oracle Separation Between SZK and BQP
Aaronson [1] proved the following result:
Theorem 2.1. There exists an oracle A such that SZKA 6⊆ BQPA.
Our own proofs follow a similar structure and rely on some of Aaronson’s lemmas, so we begin by recalling
a few key details of his proof. He begins with a lower bound for the quantum query complexity of the Collision
Problem. The problem is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Collision Problem). Let n be an integer and X : {1, ..., n} → {1, ..., n}, represented in
the standard way as a list of outputs. Suppose either X is one-to-one (that is, each element of {1, ..., n} is
output for exactly one input) or X is r-to-one1 for a fixed r ≥ 2 (that is, each element of {1, ..., n} is output
for exactly r inputs or not at all.) Then given the ability to query X, the Collision Problem Colrn is to accept
if X is one-to-one and reject if X is r-to-one.
Aaronson then shows the following result, which we present without proof. Q2(·) represents the (bounded
error) quantum query complexity of the problem, defined as the number of bits of the input that the algorithm
must examine.
Lemma 2.2. Q2
(
Col2n
)
= Ω
(
n1/5
)
.
Kutin [6] proves a stronger version of the collision lower bound, Ω
(
(n/r)1/3
)
, that also applies when
r 6= 2. (This result is also a strengthening of the result of Shi [10], which gives the same bound but requires
a larger output set for the function.) From either result, a diagonalization can be performed to produce the
desired oracle separation.
3 Oracle Separation Between NIPZK and BQP
We now prove the following new result:
Theorem 3.1. There exists an oracle A such that NIPZKA 6⊆ BQPA.
It suffices to demonstrate a NIPZK algorithm for Col2n. The algorithm, inspired by the algorithm for
uniformity testing given by Malka [7], proceeds as follows. The prover divides the shared random string into
two strings r1 and r2, each of length n. For each ri, it chooses uniformly a string xi with X(xi) = ri. It
then sends the chosen xi to the verifier. The verifier accepts if X(xi) = ri for both i.
We now prove the algorithm is NIPZK. First, we prove its completeness. If X is one-to-one, then its
image equals its codomain, and so the xi can always be selected to be valid, regardless of the ri. Thus the
verifier will always accept any one-to-one function.
Next, we prove its soundness. If X is two-to-one, then half of its codomain is not in its image. Thus,
with probability 34 , at least one of r1 or r2 is not in the image of X. Thus, with probability
3
4 , the prover
cannot select xi that the verifier will accept. Thus the soundness error is
1
4 .
Next, we prove its perfect zero-knowledge property. The simulator can simply randomly pick two inputs
x1 and x2, then run them through X to get appropriate ri. Since the xi are selected uniformly, when X is
one-to-one the ri are also uniformly distributed. Furthermore, for those ri, there is only one possible pair
of xi; thus the simulator can exactly recreate the distribution over inputs to the verifier. From there, it can
simply perfectly simulate any verifier on those inputs.
Thus Col2n ∈ NIPZK, and the theorem follows as above.
1It is sufficient for our result to restrict the problem to the r = 2 case.
2
4 Conclusion
We constructed a NIPZK query algorithm for the collision problem. Using this algorithm and the quantum
query lower bound on the collision problem we have demonstrated the existence of an oracle relative to
which NIPZK 6⊆ BQP. This result has applications to the quantum-resistance of cryptography and cryp-
tocurrency, where algorithms occasionally rely on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocols. Our result
suggests that the use of those proofs does not introduce vulnerabilities into those algorithms in the pres-
ence of a quantum adversary. The next step would be to extend this oracle separation into an algebraic
oracle separation [2], which would rule out a wider array of proof techniques and give additional evidence
that NIPZK 6⊆ BQP.
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